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Abstract: The current research studies the usefulness of Cressey’s fraud risk factor framework adopted from 
SAS No. 99 to prevent fraud from occurring. In accordance with Cressey’s theory, pressure, opportunity and 
rationalization are existing when fraud occurs. The study suggests variables as proxy measures for pressure 
and opportunity, and test these variables using publicly available information relating to a set of fraud firms 
and a sample of no-fraud firms. Two pressure proxies and two opportunity proxies are identified and 
suggested to be significantly related to financial statement fraud. We find that leverage and sale to account 
receivable are positively related to the likelihood of fraud. Audit committee size and board of directors’ size 
are also linked to decrease the level of financial statement fraud. A binary logistic model based on examples of 
fraud risk factors of fraud triangle model measures the likelihood of financial statement fraud and can assist 
experts. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Increasing the number of financial frauds such as Enron and WorldCom rise public concern regarding the 
reliability of financial statements. Fraud is a discussion that receives high level of attention from regulators, 
auditors, and the public due to the increment in corporate failures. According to prior studies, organizations 
commonly try to investigate on detecting frauds rather than prevention. For instance, Libby & Tan (1994), 
Bonner & Lewis’s (1990), Mui (2009), Alleyne et al. (2010), Hassink et al. (2009) examined factors that may 
have a direct impact on detecting fraud. Although there are numbers of studies on fraud, the Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE 2012) reported a high percentage of fraud occurrence worldwide. The 
report analyzed 1388 fraud cases globally and categorized fraud into three groups of asset misappropriation, 
corruption and financial statement fraud. The findings indicated that asset misappropriation has the most 
frequency with more than 86 percent of cases but caused the lowest range of loss at US$ 120000. In contrast, 
financial statement fraud involved less than 8 percent of the cases, but the majority of losses were related to 
this category with US$ 1 million.  
 
In reaction to the weaknesses of the fraud detection process, the Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 
99 was established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) in October 2002. The 
objective of SAS No. 99 was improving the efficiency and productivity of auditors in fraud detection by 
assessing the fraud risk factors in organizations. Before the establishment of SAS No.99, AICPA (1988) issued 
SAS 53 to explain the auditors’ roles in identifying errors and material misstatements that lead to financial 
statement. However, Moyes & Hasan (1996) believed that the concentration on auditors’ qualification in 
fraud detection is insufficient. Therefore, SAS No. 82 was established in 1997 to help auditors in detecting the 
fraud of financial statements practically. This standard provides more comprehensive instructions about 
fraud detection by observing high-risk areas and divisions compared to SAS 53. Additionally, due to the high 
rate of business failures, new auditing standards (SAS No. 99) concentrate on the requirements of regulators 
and auditors for preventing and detecting fraud. According to Ramos (2003), the objective of SAS 99 is 
increasing the auditors’ role to fully incorporating fraud in the audit process. The fraud risk factors of SAS 99 
are based on the fraud triangle model developed by Cressey (1953). Based on this model, the fraud risk 
factors categorized into three groups of pressure/motivation, opportunity and rationalization. The prior 
studies indicated that evaluation of this information about fraud may enhance the level of risk assessment 
and detection, but the literature on the relationship between Cressey’s theory and financial statement fraud is 
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limited. The majority of researchers in detecting fraud utilized data from developed countries, particularly 
USA.  
 
The current study extends the issue to Malaysian organizations, because according to PwC’s global economic 
crime survey (2011) 44% of respondents in Malaysia were victims to one or more frauds in 2011. The 
current study also use proxy variables rating pressure/ motivation and opportunity, in accordance with prior 
studies. In addition, this study tests two legs of fraud triangle model to assess likelihood of financial 
statement fraud occurrence, which can be beneficial for auditors, insiders, shareholders and legislators. The 
sample of this study were selected from Security Commission Malaysia (SC), Bursa Malaysia and prior 
studies. The list of fraud firms were collected from Security Commission Malaysia (SC) during 2002-2012. 
The list recognized by (Kwan & Kwan, 2011) for fraudulent financial statement cases was also used in this 
study. The data were collected from DataStream database and annual reports of companies. Using 40 fraud 
firms and 100 non-fraud firms, this study examines whether the proxy variables for fraud risk factors are 
correlated to likelihood of financial statement fraud. The findings suggest that all the pressure proxy variables 
(Sales to Accounts receivables and leverage) are positively correlated to the level of financial statement fraud 
occurrence. It is also found that firms with more audit committee and board members, as opportunity 
proxies, experience low level of financial statement fraud. This study is organized as follows. The following 
section discusses the prior research and development of hypotheses, continued by research design and 
sample. In subsequent section empirical findings are reported and discussed. Finally, the conclusion is 
presented.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Prior Research and Development of Hypotheses: Recently, the involvements of researchers in fraud area 
have grown rapidly to examine potential fraud risk factors to assess, predict and detect fraud (Persons, 1995; 
Beasley, 1996; Kaminski et al. 2004). For instance, Albrecht & Romney (1986) examined usefulness of red 
flags in fraud prediction. Later, by establishing SAS 53 (1988), a large number of studies have focused on 
assessing risk of financial statements to find out the possible risk factors (Loebbecke, Eining, & Willingham, 
1989). The other studies extended Loebbecke et al. (1989) model to take in a non-fraud sample and also find 
the best model for assessing risk and detecting fraud ( Nieschwietz et al., 2000; Wilks & Zimbelman, 2004). 
The questionnaire were utilized by a number of studies to find out the significance of fraud risk factors 
determined through SAS 53 or SAS 82 in fraud prevention and detection. As an example, Albrecht and 
Romney (1986) employed 87 red flags and Bell and Carcello (2000) utilized 47 factors to estimate the 
likelihood of financial statement fraud occurrence. Asare and Wright (2004) compared the auditors utilized 
the factors determined in SAS 82 with auditors who don’t use the checklist and found that the diagnoses are 
less effective amongst the first group. Smith et al. (2005) investigated the most significant factors that were 
noticed by auditors to find out how auditors’ demographic factors influence the significance of fraud risk 
factors for fraud prevention in Malaysia. The findings suggested that operational and financial permanence 
factors have the highest effect on fraud prevention, continuing with management attributions and finally 
affected by industry characteristics.  
 
Using publicly existing information, Calderon and Green (1994) evaluated fraud risk factors significance in 
predicting financial reporting fraud. Later, various analytical procedures, including financial and operational 
data were used to predict and detect fraud (Blocher & Cooper, 1988; Blocher, 1992). Leverage, capital 
turnover, asset composition and firm size found as the most substantial factors for fraud detection by Persons 
(1995). In contrast, some studies discussed about the limited ability of financial ratios in fraud detection 
(Kaminski et al. 2004; Apostolou et al., 2001). Hence, American Institute of Certified Public Accountant 
(AICPA 2002) issued different standards to prove the negative impression of fraud on the accounting and 
auditing functions and also to enhance the level of fraud detection by introducing numbers of fraud risk 
factors (SAS 53, SAS 82 and SAS 99) (Heiman-Hoffman et al., 1996; Wilks & Zimbelman, 2004). Among 
different standards, SAS 99 is the only standard adopted from the fraud triangle model which will be 
discussed throughout this study. Cressey’s fraud theory, which is defined as the fraud triangle theory was 
utilized in different studies and also in issuing standards, as an instrument, to assess the significance of fraud 
risks factors in fraud detection. The Commission of the Treadway Committee (1987) examined the causes of 
fraud occurrence and confirmed Cressey’s results. The findings indicated that financial statement fraud 
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happens because of several reasons including environmental, institutional, or individual forces and 
opportunities. These forces and opportunities increase the level of pressures which in turn support 
employees and companies to involve in fraudulent activities. Moreover, the existence of explosive mixture of 
forces and opportunities increase the prevalence of financial reporting fraud. SAS No. 99 (2002) supported 
Cressey’s fraud model by stating that: “Three elements are existing when fraud happens. First, individuals 
have a pressure, which is a reason to commit fraud. Second, settings exist. Third, those involved are able to 
rationalize committing a fraudulent act. According to SAS No.99, auditors are required to detect the 
fraudulent behaviors through evaluating the existence of each condition of pressure, opportunity and 
rationalization.  
 
Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) tested whether evaluating the attitude, opportunity and incentive factors 
separately increase or decrease the level of fraud assessment by auditors. The questionnaire included 40 
factors, adopted from SAS 99, distributed amongst auditors. The findings indicated that when the perception 
of management’s attitude regarding risk of fraud is low, the level of sensitivity of auditors to opportunity and 
incentive is higher when they assess separately compared to assessing overall fraud risk. Skousen and Wright 
(2006) constructed a model consists of risk factors limited to pressures and opportunities to estimate the 
level of fraud occurrence. The findings indicated positive relationship between pressure and high level of 
fraud occurrence, and also suggested that high opportunity amongst the individuals increase the level of 
fraud incidence in companies. To improve the previous study, Skousen and Wright (2008) developed some 
proxies to measure the elements of fraud triangle and find the impact of these factors on predicting and 
detecting fraud in financial statement. The study included five proxies for pressure and two proxies for 
opportunity which were found to have significant impact on financial statement fraud. Lister (2007) 
suggested that pressure is a significant factor in committing fraud as “the foundation of heat for the fire”. He 
determined three types of pressure including personal, employment stress, and external pressure. Lister 
defined opportunity as “the fuel that keeps the fire going”. It was mentioned that even if individuals are 
motivated to perform the fraud, they cannot carry out the crime unless they have sufficient opportunity. As 
the third element of the fraud triangle model, rationalization identified as “the oxygen that keeps the fire 
burning”. Lister selected the corporate culture as a proxy to evaluate rationalization instead of individually 
measurement. Vona (2008) examined personal and corporate pressures as motivations’ proxies for fraud 
commitment. The findings suggested direct relationship between opportunity and capability to hide the 
fraudulent behavior. Hence, identifying the opportunities that increase the incidence of fraud, increase the 
ability of auditors to find out the fraud committed by individuals. The current study intends to suggest a 
logical model for assessing fraud risk instead of long red flags lists, and provide a useful tool for experts. 
 
Fraud risk factors proxies for pressure: In Cressey’s model (1953), first element represents financial 
requirements due to different problems. A number of studies examined different perspectives of pressure. 
For instance, Albrecht et al. (2008, 2010) divided pressure/motive into financial or non-financial. Murdock 
(2008) separated pressure into financial, non-financial, political and social categories. Rae and Subramaniam 
(2008) studied employees’ motivation and financial pressure dimensions. Chen and Elder (2007) identified 
six basic categories for pressure including transgression of obligations, problems originated from individual 
problems, corporate inversion, position achievement and relationship between employees. Albrecht et al. 
(2008) categorized pressure in four groups including economic, vice, job-related and other pressures. The 
findings suggested that the majority of fraud originate from financial or vice-related pressure. Chen and Elder 
(2007) used three proxies including analysts forecast error, negative cash flow from operations, and 
directors’ shareholdings pledged for loans and credits ratio to measure the pressure based on TSAS 43. 
According to TSAS 43, management pressure increase because of their profitability. In addition, managers 
focus on thresholds for earnings to affect the insights of financial statement users who are interested in 
organizations’ performance. One of the thresholds is analyst earnings forecast which can show the 
information about the earnings’ consistency (Barth & Hutton, 2004). Moreover, TSAS 43 proposed that 
profitability and productivity can be influenced by financial and operational conditions of the company. It is 
suggested that the financial situation of management or board of directors is endangered by financial 
performance of the organization. Chen and Elder (2007) used the stock pledge percentage which is measured 
by the percentage of directors’ and supervisors’ shareholdings pledged for loans and credits as a proxy for 
individuals’ financial pressure. Hence, the following hypotheses will be developed as follows: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between pressure and financial statement fraud occurrence. 
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Fraud Risk Factor Proxies for Opportunity: In accordance with Cressey model, pressure alone will not cause 
fraud commitment. The financial problems are motivations for individuals to commit fraud but the fraud 
perpetrator should find out whether he has the occasion to perform fraud without being caught. Chen and 
Elder (2007) used three proxies based on TSAS 43 to measure opportunity including related party 
transactions, CEO duality and difference between control and cash flow rights. Moyes et al. (2005) surveyed 
amongst 77 internal auditors and found that the presence of related party transactions has the second rank 
amongst various opportunity risk factors. Wilks and Zimbelman (2004) investigated 52 audit managers and 
suggested that related party transactions had third place amongst six factors. Ming and Wong (2003) also 
used this proxy to measure the opportunity. Another proxy determined by prior studies is ineffective 
monitoring that is caused by CEO duality. CEO duality increases the CEO entrenchment which decreases the 
shareholders interest. Vance (1983) suggested that CEO domination decrease the effectiveness of board to 
provide accurate control over management activities. Another proxy is organizational structure. Claessens et 
al. (2000) proposed that family owned business is a significant type of business amongst Taiwanese listed 
companies that influence the fraud occurrence. In accordance with prior discussions, the second hypothesis 
will be distributed as follows:  
H2: The level of opportunity is positively related to financial statement fraud occurrence. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
Regression Models: This study uses a logistic regression model to examine the relationship between 
pressure and opportunity factors and the level of fraud occurrence. 
Fraud= β0+ β1 SALAR + β2 LEV + β3 AUDCSIZE + β4 BRDSIZE+ ε 
Where: 
FRAUD = Coded 1 if the firm experienced fraud previously and 0 otherwise. 
SALAR= Sales to Accounts receivables  
LEV= Total debt to Total assets  
AUCSIZE= Number of audit committee members 
BRDSIZE= Number of board of directors members 
 
The FRAUD as the dependent variable is a dummy variable representing whether the firm has experienced 
fraud. Hypothesis 1 predicts that financial statement fraud is more likely to occur when the pressure is high. 
This study assumes that the coefficients on sales to accounts receivables ratio and leverage are positively 
associated with the fraud occurrence in organizations. Hypothesis 2 expects that organizations experience 
high level of fraud when there is more opportunity for fraud commitment. We expect that the numbers of 
audit committee and board of directors’ members are negatively associated with the likelihood of financial 
statement fraud occurrence. To examine our hypotheses, the regression model utilized to test the relationship 
between defined proxies and the probability of financial statement fraud occurrence.  
 
Sample selection: The sample of this research is divided into two groups of fraud and non-fraud companies. 
The list of fraud companies is originated from a study in Malaysia which investigated the governance and 
company value (Kwan & Kwan, 2011). Another source for updating fraud companies list is Security 
Commission Malaysia (SC) website. Data on leverage, total sale and account receivable is collected through 
DATASTREAM database. Another source of collecting these data is companies’ annual reports getting from 
Bursa Malaysia website. Overall, the sample includes 40 fraud companies and 100 non-fraud companies for 
the period of 2002 to 2012 for this study. 
 
4. Findings   
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for 40 fraud firms and 100 non-fraud firms with univariate tests. 
For pressure proxies, sale to account receivable (SALAR), on average, are 16.65 (4.54) for fraud (non-fraud) 
firms. The difference in SALAR between fraud and non-fraud companies is significant at 0.01 level, which 
indicate positive relationship between higher sales to account receivable and fraud occurrence. Leverage, on 
average, is 0.62 (0.22) percent of fraud (non-fraud) firms for the examined sample. The difference in leverage 
between fraud and non-fraud companies suggested to be significant at 0.01 level which shows that companies 
with fraud are more probable to indicate negative leverage from operations than non-fraud companies. The 
mean of audit committee size is 3.07 (3.46) for fraud (non-fraud) companies. The results indicate that the 
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difference in audit committee size between fraud and non-fraud companies is also significant at 1% level, 
which indicate that companies with fewer audit committee members experience more fraud. Additionally, the 
difference in number of board of directors’ members between fraud and non-fraud companies is significant at 
1 percent level.  
 
Table 1: Sample Statistics 
Risk Factors   Non-fraud firms  
(N=100) 
Mean             Std. Dev 
Fraud firms  
(N=40) 
Mean             Std. Dev 
Z value  
Wilcoxon Test 
Pressure   
SALAR 4.54 3.481 16.654 11.668 -6.510** 
LEV 0.2238 0.2010 0.620 0.622 -1.762* 
Opportunity   
AUDCSIZE 3.46 0.596 3.07 0.258 -6.610** 
BRDSIZE 7.71 1.692 6.00 1.069 -6.530** 
 
Table 2 demonstrates the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables of the study. Sale to Account receivable 
(SALAR) and Leverage (LEV) found to have positive relationship with fraud occurrence and are significant at 
0.01 level. In contrast, audit committee and board size are negatively correlated with likelihood of fraudulent 
financial statement and both are significant at 0.05 and 0.01 levels, which is consistent with the related 
hypothesis. 
 
Table 2: Correlation matrix for the variables (n=140) 
Correlations 
  SALAR leverage ACsize BSize FRAUD 
SALAR 1     
leverage .145 1    
ACsize -.211 -.094 1   
BSize -.315* -.136 .210 1  
FRAUD .653** .444** -.320* -.444** 1 
 
The binary logistic regression analysis is utilized to test the hypotheses of this study. Binary logistic 
regression refers to the cases that have only two possible types of outcomes. In this study, the dependent 
variable has two types of fraud and non-fraud companies so binary logistic regression method will be used. 
Table 3 provides the hypothesis testing results. Hypothesis 1 suggests that companies with high pressure 
experience more levels of fraud occurrence. Hypothesis 2 predicts positive relationship between opportunity 
factors and probability of fraud incidence. The developed model regress the likelihood of financial statement 
fraud (FRAUD) based on fraud risk factor proxies (pressure and opportunity). The results indicate that the 
coefficients on sale to account receivable (B= 0.352) and leverage (B= 5.749) are significantly positive at 0.05 
level, suggesting that firms with high pressure are more likely to experience fraud. In addition, audit 
committee and board size as proxies of opportunity and financial statement fraud found to have negative 
relationship, suggesting that firms with more number of audit committee and board members increase the 
level of internal control and in turn decrease the percentage of fraud occurrence in companies (B= -1.454 for 
AUDCSIZE; B= -0.735 for BRDSIZE). The findings also suggested that the effect of audit committee size is not 
significant but board size influence fraud significantly at 0.05 levels.  
 
Table 3: Logistic Regression of likelihood of fraud and fraud risk factors 
Variable  Expected sign  Coefficient  Wald  Sig  
Pressure   
SALAR + 0.352 3.958 .047* 
LEV + 5.749 3.881 .049* 
Opportunity   
AUDCSIZE _ -1.454 1.368 0.242 
BRDSIZE _ -0.735 4.278 .039* 
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5. Conclusion 
 
The current study examines two fraud risk factors adopted from the fraud triangle model which is the basis of 
different standards to evaluate the probability of fraud occurrence. 40 fraud and 100 non-fraud companies 
are selected to study and examine a logistic regression model that assess the possibility of fraud occurrence. 
Proxy variables examined in this study include sale to account receivable (SALAR) and Leverage (LEV) for 
pressure and number of audit committee members (AUDCSIZE) and number of board members (BRDSIZE) 
for opportunity. Results indicate that likelihood of fraud occurrence is positively related to more sale to 
account receivable percentage and more leverage. It is suggested that the correlation between audit 
committee and board size are negative consistent to prior studies. The limitation of this study is the inability 
to identify the appropriate proxy for rationalization as SAS no.99 also noted about the difficulty associated 
with isolating characteristics used as indicators of rationalization.  
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